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CONTRIBUTORS OF LEADING ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
WmLLiA REYNOLDS VANCE, Professor of Law, Yale University, was for-
merly Dean of the Law School of Washington and Lee University, and the
University of Minnesota Law School. He is the author of numerous lawjournal articles and of Insurance (1904) and Cascs on Insutrance (1914).
RALPH W. AIGLER is Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Among
his published works are Cases on Propcrty (1916) and, with Mr. Evans
Holbrook, Cases on Bankrnptcy (1915).
SHELDON GLUECK is at present co-operating in a survey of the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in Boston. He is a member of the New York
bar and Instructor in Criminology, Harvard University, where he received
his Ph. D. in Psychology and the Social Sciences.
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., of the New York bar, is lecturer on Finance, Grad-
uate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. He is special
counsel for the Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association to- revise the
Ohio Corporation Code.
WHARTON POOR is a member of the New York bar, author of The Amiri-
can Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading (1920) and has
served on the committee of the Maritime Law Association codifying navi-
gation laws of the United States.
THE RESIGNATION OF DEAN SWAN
With the deepest regret the Yale Law Journal records the
resignation of Dean Thomas W. Swan to accept an appointment
to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. It freely recog-
nizes that the appointment of one so admirably qualified in abil-
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ity, professional attainment and temperament for high judicial
office is to be applauded and approved, but it feels none the
less keenly, together with the faculty and students, the well
nigh irreparable loss suffered in the termination of his leader-
ship of the Yale Law School. The students will sorely miss his
quick understanding of their point of view, his helpful sympathy
alike in times of good and ill fortune, and his unfailing courtesy
- and considerateness under all circumstances; the members of
. the faculty will regret the withdrawal of a wise leader, a fair
and tactful presiding officer, a highly efficient teacher, a valued
friend and comrade; but the editorial board and management
of this Journal suffer a peculiar loss. Ever ready with en-
couragement and aid in the difficult task of maintaining the
Journal as a worthy exponent of the work and the character
of the Law School, he never tired in lending counsel, and even
more material aid to the business management in solving the
innumerable problems that arise in the conduct of such a pub-
lication. It is earnestly hoped that articles from his pen may
continue to appear in these pages, and that his friendship and
counsel are only removed, and not withdrawn.
Robert Maynard Hutchins, Secretary of Yale University, has
been named as Acting Dean of the Law School. He was grad-
uated from Yale College in 1921, received an honorary Master's
Degree there in 1922 and his LL. B. from the Yale School of
Law in 1925. Since then he has been a lecturer in the Law
School.
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
The Yale Law School owes more to Simeon E. Baldwin than
to any other person. This is not the debt of an abstraction to
a name; it is the debt of several thousands of law students and
teachers to a strong and steadfast human personality.
No one living person knows the whole story of Judge Bald-
win's service to this school. For almost sixty years his name
has been on the roll of the faculty; and for more than forty of
those years he played the part of an active teacher and director.
Soon after the Civil War he recalled the dying school to life;
he renewed and expanded the faculty; he organized graduate
work in law, developing especially the work in Roman law and
comparative law; he gave constant and efficient instruction in
many courses, especially in railroad law, constitutional law and
the conflict of laws; he wrote freely for the Law Journal; for
a long period he carried much and perhaps all of the financial
responsibility for the school's existence, and now has remem-
bered the school most generously in his will; and above all,
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throughout his long service, he impressed his students and col-
leagues with the great qualities of his character and personality.
He was strong, inflexible and confident, prompt and definite of
decision, unfailingly exact in meeting appointments, austere in
appearance but generous and warm-hearted in reality.
Few men have had as wide a range of interests and activities
as did Judge Baldwin; and it was outside as well as in that he
served the school and the university. To give a full account
would require much research and would fill these pages to over-
flowing.
As an author he was assiduous and successful, his writings
covering many fields. Among the volumes from his pen are a
Connecticut Digest, a treatise and a casebook on railroad law;,
and separate volumes on Private International Law, The Ameri-
can Judiciary, Modern Political Institutions, The Young Man
and the Law. In the library of the school are four bound vol-
umes containing approximately ninety of his articles and pam-
phlets. These volumes are respectively entitled: "Law and
Law Reform," "Studies in History," "International and Consti-
tutional Law," and "Studies in Legal Education and Social
Science." This can hardly be a complete collection, although the
volumes were collected and indexed by Judge Baldwin's own
hand.
As a scholar and public-spirited citizen he played an important
part in a surprising variety of organizations. He actually served
as president of each of the following: American Bar Association,
International Law Association, Association of American Law
Schools, American Historical Association, American Political
Science Association and American Social Science Association.
For twelve years he was director of the comparative law bureau
of the American Bar Association. He was a member of learned
societies abroad, attended their congresses and contributed to
their proceedings.
All of the foregoing Judge Baldwin combined with active prac-
tice at the bar. For seventeen years he served his state as a
Judge of the Supreme Court, for the last three being Chief
Justice. On reaching the age limit, he retired as judge only
to be elected for two successive terms as Governor. Next he
was the candidate of his party for United States Senator, fail-
ing of election only because his state was caught in one of the
national landslides. These positions and honors came to him
unsought. Not he the man to partake in any scramble for office
or the scheming and bargaining of politics. For years the press
of his state has acclaimed him as the First Citizen of Connecti-
cut.
The attempt will not be made here to characterize the quality
of his service in all of these many lines, except as that is char-
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acterized by their very number and the standing that he at-
tained in each of them. Scaling many heights, it may well be
that he did not attain the highest of all. As a statesman, con-
sidering his austerity and his remoteness from political striv-
ings and manipulation, his success and achievement are marvel-
lous. As an author, considering the breadth of his interests
and his work in the world, the amount and quality of his writ-
ing are astonishing. As a judge and lawyer, few have ever
reached so high a plane. And as an educator, he contributed
so much that any weakness or limitations of the product must be
charged to his colleagues and assistants rather than to him.
Smaller men than he have at times criticized Judge Baldwin's
work as an author and educator, as a judge and a statesman.
One of the compensations of life is the opportunity it offers to
point out the flaws in the work of greater men. But an even
greater compensation is the opportunity, rarely offered as in
the present instance, of appreciating character and personality.
Judge Baldwin practiced, though he never unwisely preached,
adherence to the highest mores of his time. The frugality and
simplicity of his life were about as striking as was the unostenta-
tious liberality of his contributions to others. He was confident,
definite and inflexible; and yet his modesty and sense of propor-
tion are strongly witnessed by his unswerving loyalty to this law
school, a loyalty expressed even in his last will and testament,
in spite of its departure from at least one of his long supported
policies. Such a man is the man to live with. He is the man
whose memory will be kept green; partly, indeed, because of his
ideas and his unusual achievements, but even more largely be-
cause of his life and character. The Yale Law School will be
proud to continue to build upon the broad and massive founda-
tions laid by this man throughout his long and noble life.
ITEMS FORWARDED FOR COLLECTION AND REMITTANCE
Because of the increased frequency of bank failures 1 in recent
years, the question as to what protection can and should be
granted the various parties dealing with banks has become a
1 "Unlike the record of commercial failures, the statistics of banking
suspensions in the United States for the year 1926 show sharp increases
in both number and liabilities. Totaling 608, the banking suspensions
compare with 464 in 1925, an increase of more than 30 per cent., and last
year's indebtedness, at $212,074,999 is nearly 29 per cent. above the $164,-
698,510 reported for 1925." DUN'S REvmIW, No. 1737, Jan. 8, 1927, at 26,
A table of bank failures from 1900 through 1925 can be found on page 298
of the WORLD ALiANAC AND Boox op FAcTs for 1927. For the five-year
periods of 1911-1915, 1916-1920, 1921-1925 the number of bank failures
were 702, 307 and 2616, and the liabilities were (in thousands of dollars)
212519, 111861, and 973202 respectively.
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matter of present importance and interest. In the recent case
of Larabee Flour Mills v. First Natl Banzk of Hcn-yetta, 13 Fed.
(2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) the plaintiff, through his bank,
forwarded a draft to the defendant bank indorsed to the plain-
-tiff's bank for collection and remittanzce of the proceeds. The
defendant bank presented the draft to the drawee who paid it
-with a check on the drawee's account as depositor in the de-
fendant bank. The defendant accepted the check as payment,
creditedthe drawee's account with the amount of the check, and
,on the same day mailed its own draft of an equivalent amount
on a third bank to the plaintiff's bank. The defendant bank
having closed later on the same day, the draft was not paid.
The plaintiff's claim for a priority to the amount of the draft
was denied (Faris, J., dissenting) because the defendant bank
had received nothing from an outside source by which its assets
might be augmented, but instead, had collected the item from
itself by simply transferring the amount from the account of
the drawer of the check to another account.
The collection and clearance of checks and other items is at
-present a very important function of the banking system.2 The
volume of business done through negotiable paper has seen
tremendous expansion during the past several decades, so that
now the currency transactions of banks form but a small portion
of their financial dealings.3 This development has been deemed
expedient by banks, especially by those of the Federal Reserve
System. To encourage still further the use of negotiable items
in place of currency, bankers have devised means for making
collections cheaper, quicker and safer. The routing system of
the Federal Reserve Banks 4 and the par collection program 5 are
illustrative of this policy of facilitating collections.
One of the methods of making the process of collection safer
is to give the party, forwarding an item for collection, protec-
tion in case of the insolvency of the collecting bank. The courts
protect the forwarder sufficiently in the event the collecting bank
fails before the item is actually collected, since he can recover
the instrument forwarded.6 But if the collecting agent fails
after collection, his position is generally held to be that of a
2 "It has been estimated that from 90% to 95% of all payments made
in the United States are made by check rather than in actual money."
A1nIRIcAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING, STANDARr BANKING (1924) 128.
3Ibid. 128-130, 156-193, 417-436; KNIFFIN, A=LERIcAN BANKING PRC-
TICs (1921) 80 if; SPAHR, THE CLEARING AND COLuCTxON OF CHECKS (1926)
cc. 1-9.
4 SPAHR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 164 ff.
S Ibid. 232-290.
cLippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369 (1914);
BOGERT, TRusTs (1921) 18; SCoTT, CASES ON THE LAV7 OF TRUSTS (1919)
64, n. And if the instrument is collected by the bank after known in, olv-
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general creditor only.7 Some courts, however, have held an in-
dorsement "for collection and remittance" to impress a "trust"
upon the proceeds of the collection and have accordingly given
the forwarding party a priority." Although the latter decisions
have been criticized, 9 their frequent recurrence in recent years is
of significance. 10 In a few states, statutes have been invoked
to give preferred claims in this situation.11
A refusal- to allow priority hampers the transfer and collec-
tion of negotiable paper and tends to discourage its use since
the risk of loss incurred by the forwarding party is a serious
one. Inasmuch as banks contract to safeguard their own in-
terests, the actual burden and losses fall on the entire business
community. Thus the problem involves the general public as
well as the banking fraternity. The real controversy narrows
to one between the local depositors of the failed bank and the
distant owner of the paper collected. The depositor's dealings
with his bank are had after a deliberate choice, the relation is
continuous, and the intent and understanding is to place the
deposit to the general use of the bank. The owner of the collec-
tion item, however, does not ordinarily know what bank will
ultimately handle it and, if the item has been indorsed for
collection and remittance, has no intention of putting the pro-
ceeds to the risk of its business. The question is whether this
factual difference in the quality of a collecting bank's obligations
to those forwarding items in this way, as contrasted with its
regular deposit obligations, can be recognized in law.
ency, it is a fraud upon the forwarder and he can recover his claim in
full. ScoTT, op. cit. supra, at 68; Clark, Sparks & Sons v. Americus Nat'l
Bank, 230 Fed. 738 (S. D. Ga. 1916).
7 This result is generally reached in one of two ways. Some cases arc
based on the principle that after collection only a debtor-creditor relation-
ship exists between the collecting bank and forwarding party. Infra note
28. Other cases, like the instant decision, are determined because of the
inability to trace "trust" funds. Infra note 12.
S Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Bohannan, 141 Va. 285, 127 S. E.
161 (1925); Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. B. 379
(1924); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis v. Millspaugh, 281 S. W. 733,
282 S. W. 706 (Mo. 1926) ; Murray v. North Liberty Savings Bank, 196 Iowa,
729, 195 N. W. 354 (1923) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Dennis, 20 N. M. 96, 146
Pac. 948 (1915) ; People v. Iuka State Bank, 229 Ill. App. 4 (1923) ; State
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 124 Ark. 531, 187 S. W. 673 (1916); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992
(1921); Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Brown, 69 Mont. 140, 220 Pac. 1114
(1923).
9 (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 627; (1924) 9 IoWA L. BULL. 134;
(1926) 75 U. PA. L. R-V. 69; (1923) 72 U. PA. L. REv. 56.
10 Cf. (1925) 42 A. L. R. 754, note.
11 2 PATON, DIGEST (1926) 1467 asserts "Relative to the question as to
whether there is any movement for legislation 'giving a preference to the
holders of cashier's checks of an insolvent bank would state that a statute
of that nature is now in force for which see Georgia Ann. Code (Supp.
684
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The majority opinion in the Larabee case is an application of
the so-called "augmentation of assets" rule by a federal court.'2
The cases applying this doctrine have assumed that the rela-
tions between the paltes were of a fiduciary character. The
"trust" creditor of the bankrupt is entitled to satisfaction of
his claim if he can show that the trust fund, or property into
which it was converted, came into the hands of the trustee in
bankruptcy and increased the assets of the estate, even though
the property cannot be exactly identified.13 This requirement
of an augmentation of assets is apparently consistent with the
theory on which trust funds are given priority in insolvency."4
The "augmentation of assets" rule has been used as a means of
tracing misappropriated trust funds,'* but as applied by the
federal courts "augmentation of assets" has received a very
narrow definition.1G Under this restricted interpretation, fol-
lowed by the Larabee case, the payment of a collection item by
1922) par. 2280 h. h. And there is the possibility that other states may
enact such a statute in the near future. (Montana, Rev. Codes (1921)
pars. 6108, 6109 was amended in 1925, and under the amendment a prefer-
ence is effectuated) 2
"
2 American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 420 (C. C. .4 2d, 1910);
Nyssa Dist. v. Bank, 3 Fed. (2d) 648 (D. C. Or. 1925); Empire State
Surety Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. Sth, 1912); Mechanics
& Metals Nat'l Bank v. Buchanan, 12 Fed. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 8th, 192G).
See also People v. Mechanics' Bank, 78 N. Y. 209 (1879); Midland Nat1
Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994 (1399).
13 Cox v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 247 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. Sth,
1917); Zenor v. McFarlin, 238 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
14 The trust funds do not constitute any part of the assets of the bankz-
rupt if the particular fund has been kept separate and apart from the
bankrupt's own money, or if it is distinctly traceable into property or other
funds into which it has been converted. L. R. A. 1916 C, 23-27. "The right
of a creditor to recover or reclaim property of his -which was held by the
bankrupt in trust for him, or to receive in full payment out of trust funds in
the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy, does not depend upon the insolvency
laws of the states or laws giving priority to favored claims. In fact, it
is not a question of priority at all, but of the right of the owner of
property or money to reclaim it." BLACK, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY (4th ed.
1926) § 685.
"ziBGERT, TRuSTS (1921) 531-535; Mechanis & Metals Nat'l Bank v.
Buchanan, supra note 12.
16 See Empire States Surety Co. v. Carroll County, supra note 12, at 604.
In Spokane v. First Nat'l Bank, 68 Fed. 979 (C. C. A. 9th, 1895) Gilbert,
J., at 982, says: "If the trust fund has been dissipated in the transaction
of the business before insolvency, it will be impossible to demonstrate that
the estate has been thereby increased or better prepared to meet the de-
mands of creditors, and even if it is proven that the trust fund has been
but recently disbursed, and has been used to pay debts that otherwise would
be claims against the estate, there would be manifest inequity in requiring
that the money so paid out should be refunded out of the assets, for in
so doing the general creditors whose demands remain unpaid are in effect
contributing to the payment of the creditors whose demands have been
.e xtinguished by the trust fund. Both the settled principles of equity and
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check on the depositor's account in the collecting bank has been
held to be a mere shifting of book credits of the bank and not
to increase the assets 17 coming into the hands of the receiver.'"
This limited doctrine of augmentation of assets is not followed
in many state courts, 19 and the soundness and consistency of
the application of this federal rule is questionable.20  There is a
,dictum in the Larabee case to the effect that a priority would
have been granted if the payment by the depositor had been
made in currency, or by check on some other bank.21 It seems
absurd thus to allow extensive and valuable financial rights of
parties to hinge on such adventitious circumstances as the
drawee's medium of payment. It also seems commercially un-
,desirable to permit a person to alter a third party's financial
rights merely by "the act of the drawee in taking out of the
collecting bank by his check an amount in money equal to the
draft, and after walking around the block, or, indeed, without
,even walking around the block, again paying this same money
into the bank in exchange for the draft held by the bank against
him." "
the weight of authority sustain the view that the plaintiff's right to establish
his trust and recover his fund must depend upon his ability to prove that
his property is in its original or a substituted form in the hands of the
defendant."
17Assets has been roughly defined as the effects of an insolvent debtor
or bankrupt applicable to the payment of his debts. (a) If physical
funds or tangible property is meant there is no increase in assets in
almost all instances, since the collecting bank ordinarily receives a chose
in action or credit which can be applied towards its clearing house balance
,or towards decreasing its obligations to its depositors or others. A physical
augmentation of funds as a direct result of collecting an item rarely
occurs. The word assets as used in the rule has been given a peculiar
technical meaning of funds or money actually paid into the vaults of the
bank. (b) If it means the net worth of the collecting bank, any fact or
payment which decreased the obligations of the bank would increase its
assets. Does not the cancelled amount decrease the bank's obligations to
its depositors, and in this way most effectively swell or augment its assets?
-'When the bank was in duty bound to collect the cash and to remit, but
instead retained the cash, when remitting would have decreased its assets,
it follows that by retaining the cash its assets were augmented." Calla-
way, C. J., in Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Brown, supra note 8, at 147, 220
Pac. at 116. (c) Another possible use of the term assets is to describe
in bookkeeping the side of the ledger distinguished from the "liabilities"
accounts. According to the double entry system of bookkeeping where for
every debit entry there must be a corresponding credit entry, there can be
no increase in assets if by "increase" it is meant to have the assets side
of the ledger larger than the liabilities accounts. Query, whether this
bookkeeping notion of assets may not have influenced the federal courts.
is Supra note 12.
19 Supra note 8. Cf. Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 664, note.
20See (1926) 75 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 70.
21 13 Fed. (2d) at 331.
22Ibid. at 335 (dissent of Faris, J.).
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The decision in Farimer's Nat'l Bank of Burlington v. Pribblc - *
is a consistent extension of the federal doctrine of augmentation.
Here the item was paid to the insolvent bank through a clearance
arrangement with another bank, and the funds of the collecting
bank were held not to have been augmented because on the day
of the collection an unfavorable balance existed against it. The
case of First Naztl Bank of Ventura. v. Williams 24 goes farther,
in effect being exactly contra to the dictum in the Larabee case
as to payment by check. In this case the payment was actually
made by a check on another bank, but the court considered how
the check itself was paid. Since the check was used in clearance
to pay checks drawn on the collecting bank, the cort held it
did not place any cash in the bank, being used to reduce obliga-
tions and not to increase assets. Inasmuch as in almost all
instances payment is made by check, and since, owing to the use
of clearing houses or private clearance arrangements, -5 very
rarely will actual funds come into the bank, the strict applica-
tion of the federal rule will make it practically impossible to
forward collection items with safety. The various rules of trac-
ing misappropriated trust funds, such as set forth in Claytoes
Case, -6 In re Hallett's Estate, 27 and in the federal cases, are all
based on the conception of tracing a res consisting of physical
funds or currency. But, since banks do not to-day deal primarily
in physical currency, but to an increasing extent deal in book
credits, accounts and choses in action, the strict application to
banking problems of tracing rules made for following money
in specie, will almost invariably result in a denial of protection
to "trust" claims because of inability to trace funds. If a pref-
erence was ever desirable, and it has been held so in many type
situations, the mere fact that to-day, in exactly the same situa-
tions, commercial paper or credits are nearly always used
instead of currency, should not operate to destroy all grounds
for protection. It rather indicates that the trust doctrine for
this purpose is inadequate as applied.
23 15 Fed. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926).
2415 Fed. (2d) 585 (E. D. N. C. 1926).
25 See textbooks cited in notes 2, 3, 41. Checks are normally collected
through a clearing house arrangement. The amount of the check is credited
at the clearing house to the bank to offset the items drawn on it turned in
by other banks. If the day's balance is unfavorable to the bank, it must
itself pay the deficit to the clearing house. Even if the clearance balance
is favorable, it is often paid by a clearing house draft which, wvhen turned
in the next day, serves the purpose of carrying over the previous day's
balance. Very seldom are cash settlements or cash payments of cheeks
made between banks.
26 1 Mer. 572 (Ch. 1816).
27 ,natchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879). See L. R. A. 1916 C, 21,
note; cf. Scott, The Right to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled 7ith Other
Money (1913) 27 HARv. L. 1REV. 125.
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Regardless of how the money came into the hands of the
collecting bank, and assuming an "augmentation of assets,"
nevertheless many courts deny a preferred claim on the theory
that from the moment of collection the collecting bank is pre-
sumptively a debtor, being entitled and accustomed to treat the
proceeds of the paper as its own.28  This is the view generally
favored, and has been called the majority doctrine.2, The pre-
sumption of a debtor relation may be overthrown by evidence
of an agreement or understanding that the banker should hold
the proceeds of the collection as a trust fund 30 or by evidence
that the bank in fact treated the proceeds of the collection as a
trust fund.31 The basis of this so-called majority view is the
premise that the relationship existing (fiduciary or debtor-
creditor) is dependent upon. the "intention" of the parties.,"
Since they are "presumed" to have contracted with knowledge
of and in accordance with known banking customs, and since
in banking circles indorsement of items for "collection and re-
mittance" is not understood as forbidding the mingling of the
collection proceeds with the general funds, the parties are held
to have contemplated such mingling. From this it is argued that
if the privilege to mingle exists, no specific res for the so-called
trust can be found, and therefore because of this custom of
mingling funds only a debtor-creditor relation exists after collec-
tion.33 Thus, if intention is to be the governing factor, these
cases practically make the banking custom of mingling, the
unalterable and unequivocal index of the intention of the parties.
But the indorsement "for collection and remittance" designates
a contrary intention from that inferred from the bank custom
of mingling. It contemplates the establishment of a fiduciary
relationship, since the restrictive indorsement is the normal
method of retaining control over negotiable instruments in the
28 Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 6; Hecker Milling Co.
v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 106 N. E. 333 (1922); Central
Trust Co. v. Hanover Trust Co., 242 Mass. 265, 136 N. E. 336 (1922);
United States Nat'l Bank v. Glanton, 146 Ga. 786, 92 S. E. 625 (1911);
L. R. A. 1917 F, 600, note; Gonyer v. Williams, 168 Calif. 452, 143' 1ac.
736 (1914). See First Nat'l Bank of Ventura v. Williams, supra note 24,
at 586; cf. Smith & Co. v. Montgompry, 209 Ala. 100, 95 So. 290 (1923);
Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1915);
Commercial Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533 (1892). See
also Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 211 N. W. 517 (Iowa, 1926).
29 Supra note 9. See Stone, Legal Problems in the Transmission of Funds
(1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 507, 514; (1924) 24 A. L. R. 1150, note.
30 Sherwood v. Savings Bank, 103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W. 352 (1894).
31 Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Armstrong, 36 Fed. 59 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1888).
32 Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 6. See Stone, op. cit.
supra note 29, at 509.
33 Smith & Co. v. Montgomery, supra note 28; Commonwealth v. Trades-
men's Trust Co., supra note 28.
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hands of agents.:- This particular form of indorsement should
be distinguished from indorsements in blank, "for collection,"
"for collection and credit," and "for collection and deposit,"
which forms do not clearly express an intent not to become a
general creditor to the amount of the collection proceeds. Hence,
in the case of items indorsed "for collection and remittance" we
have two conflicting indices of the intention of the parties, and,
in view of present banking practice, it seems undesirable that
a legal deduction from the customs of the trade should com-
pletely outweigh an express stipulation of one of the parties if
"intention" is really what the court is endeavoring to carry out.
If intention of the parties is the important element, the deci-
sions in those cases which impress a trust 35 as to the collection
proceeds are probably sound in spite of the asserted fallacy of
their reasoning and the fictitious existence of a trust res,: G since
an indorsement "for collection and remittance" seems the only
practical way for a party to designate his intent. It is under-
stood that if the general relation of debtor-creditor already ex-
isted between the parties it might be inferred that as regards
the proceeds of this particular item the same relation should
exist, since ordinarily the collecting bank would immediately
credit the amount collected to the forwarder's deposit account.
But even when the parties have had previous business dealings,
it seems desirable from a banking standpoint for a person to
be able to so indorse an item as to designate his intention to
keep its collection separate from his other dealings with the bank.
In the case of a stranger to the collecting bank, as in the prin-
cipal case, there will have been no prior relations to help show
the intention of the parties, and the intention must be derived
from the indorsement "for collection and remittance" and the
customs of the bank. The legal effect given to the bank custom
of mingling collection proceeds %with general funds in this situa-
tion is undoubtedly making a mere fiction of the rule basing the
relationship on the intention of the parties. Actually, however,
intention alone without other overt acts and conditions, should
not be enough.
Some cases in order to establish a priority have stated that
the bank's mingling was wrongful,37 thus makling the entire
3-RANDOLPH, COuMERCIAL PAPER (2d ed. 1S99) §§ 717, 726, 735; BP-u.' -
NAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (4th ed. 1924) 311-320; DANIUL, NE-
GOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1913) § 698 d. See Freeman's Nat'l Bani:
v. Nat'l Tube Works, 151 Mlass. 413, 418, 24 N. E. 779 (1890).
35 Supra note 8.
36 Plano Mfg. Co. -. Auld, 14 S. D. 512, 86 N. W. 21 (1901); First Nat'l
'Rank v. Dennis, supra note 8; cf. Hecker Milling Co. Y. Cosmopolitan Trust
Co., supra note 28, at 186, 136 N. E. at 335; (1926) 35 YALE Lw JOLTNu,,%,
,27.
37See Holder v. Western German Bank, 136 Fed. 90 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905);
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banking fraternity guilty of breach of trust. It is doubtful if
such statements are necessary for these decisions.38 In almost
all cases, factually no physical funds are mingled or even
handled. With the growth of the clearing house system and
Federal Reserve system the proportion of currency handled in
relation to total volume of business done is constantly decreas-
ing.'0  Except for the cash on hand to meet counter payments
(usually not over 10%) the entire amount of deposits will con-
sist merely of bookkeeping entries.
Courts which have held a debtor-creditor relation to arise im-
mediately upon collection have repeatedly said "we think the
custom of the banking business is so universal that we may take
judicial notice of it, that items collected for another bank are
in fact credited whether the provision 'for collection and re-
mittance' be among the directions of the forwarding bank to its
correspondent or not." 40 This statement is only literally true
if a very broad use is made of the word "credited." Modern
banking business is not so ample as to allow one adequately to
describe the items collected as being "credited," at least if the
legal effect of being so "credited" will determine whether a
debtor-creditor or fiduciary relationship exists. American banks
generally have separate transit or collection departments which
keep their own special records, and if the collection de-
partment keeps credit and debit accounts they are separate and
distinct from the general deposit accounts of the bank.41 Many
items pass through the hands of a bank, being debited and cred-
ited solely in the collection accounts and not reaching the gen-
eral books of the bank. Even the precise procedure followed in
many transit and collection departments is not what is com-
monly conceived of as debiting and crediting a ledger account.42
State Bank v. First Natl Bank, supra note 8; Spokane Eastern Trust
Co. v. United States Steel Prod. Co., 290 Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
38 It has been held that where the trust fund is very small, the trustee
might properly put some of his money with it in order to invest it to the
best advantage. 1 PERRY, TRuSTS (6th ed. 1911) 463. This same principle
might be applied to the banking situation. The collection proceeds of
items from any one individual correspondent is in like manner very small
as compared with the entire funds handled and invested by the bank. When
a trustee of small trust funds is denied the privilege of mingling them
with his own funds, "nobody will serve as trustee if liable to be harrassed
qt every step about such petty things." See Graver's Appeal, 50 Pa. St.
189, 193 (1865).
39 Supra notes 2, 3.
40 Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 6, at 204, 90 Atl. at
376.
41 LANGSTON, PRACTICAL BANK OPERATION (1921) cc. 5-8, 4; KNIFFIN, op.
cit. supra note 3, c. 11; WESTERFIELD, BANKING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE:
(1921) 686 ff., 1231-1244.
42 SPAHR, op. cit. supra note 3, 429-477; supra note 41.
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In fact, some banks make no bookkeeping entries at all upon
some "collection and remittance" items. Banking practice is
now so complex and diversified and banks act in so many capa-
cities and functions, that the relations between parties litigant
should depend on the particular function served, rather than on
vague general notions of what a bank is.
Of course, if actually credited to a drawing account,
it is fair to say that a debtor-creditor relation exists.
But otherwise, since the collection department functions dif-
ferently, and often distinctly, from the other general depart-
ments of the bank, it should receive separate consideration in
the courts in bankruptcy proceedings, as for example does the
safe deposit department.-M The fact that banks have often de-
manded payment for performing collection services tends to
show that the quality of their obligation when acting in this
capacity is fiduciary, and something more than mere custom of
mingling funds should be necessary, to cause a change in rela-
tion from agent or trustee to debtor. In this connection it is of
significance that the ver case that announced the view of
debtor-creditor relation between bank and depositor said that
in case a fiduciaryj relation should be shown it would be given
effect."
Because of the banking custom of mingling funds and because
usually no funds come into the bank's hands, and since almost
all of the cases use the law of "trusts" in their reasoning, the
necessity of having an orthodox trust res may well be questioned.
In certain situations when the result to be attained seemed de-
sirable the trust concept has been enlarged to cover facts
where no factual res can be found. Thus some courts have
held a debtor to be a trustee for a third person, upon assenting
to a direction by his creditor to pay that third person." Also,
there is no orthodox trust res when a person makes a deposit of
money with no intention of having the identical money set apart
or used, but with instructions that a similar amount is to be
used for some specific purpose."1 But with much less reason than
can be found in the facts of the Larabee case, a majority of
the American courts have held a trust to exist and have given
the specific depositor priority over general creditors in the
event of the insolvency of the depositary. 7 The result to be
attained would probably fully warrant a similar extension of
43 (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 795.
"44See Foley v. Hill, 2 H. L. C. 28, 39 (1848).
45See ScOTw, CASES ON TRusTs (1919) 48, n. 2; (1927) 36 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 394, 399.
461n re Barned's Banldng Co., 39 L. J. Ch. 635 (1870); see Stone, loc.
cit. supra note 29; (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 177; (1927) 36 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 394, 399.
47 See COSTIGAN, CASES ON TRUSTS (1925) 124.
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the principles of trust law so as to impress a "trust" upon the
proceeds of items indorsed "for collection and remittance."
In many of the cases of the Larabee type the defunct bank
had forwarded a cashier's draft on another bank as remittance
for the collected item. In such situations the bankrupt collect-
ing bank might be considered as having made itself "trustee"
of its claim against its drawee bank, the claim being the trust
res. Thus, for the purpose in hand, the check might well be
held to be an equitable assignment of the funds in the hands
of the collecting bank's depository, and such has been held in
certain cases.48 But even in the event that the collecting bank
does not remit a draft, it seems that there is no less reason tb
protect the forwarder of an item "for collection and remit-
tance."
POWERS OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS UNDER THE "COMITY" RULE
Courts have consistently said that under the "comity rule" a
corporation may exercise, in a state other than that of its in-
corporation, all the powers set forth in its articles of association
unless expressly forbidden by statute or "policy." Such a statute
or "policy" may forbid (1) the exercise of a particular corporate
power by such corporation within the state, in which event the
corporation has a particular disability,1 or (2) the exercise of
all corporate power by such corporation within the state, in
which event the corporation has a total disability.2
In the recent case of Commonwealth Acceptance Corporation
v. Jordan, 246 Pac. 796 (Calif. 1926) the plaintiff, a Delaware
corporation, having power to create shares of different par
values, sought a mandamus to compel the secretary of state of
California to issue a license granting the plaintiff permission to
do business within that state. A California statute forbade the
organization of domestic corporations with power to create
shares of different par values. The court granted the writ on
the ground that inter-state "comity" entitles-a foreign corpora-
tion to exercise its powers within the state in the absence of
48 Federal Reserve Bank v. Bohannan, supra note 8; Federal Reserve
Bank v. Peters, supra note 8; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis v. Mill-
spaugh, supra note 8. Contra: Leach v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 211
N. W. 506 (Iowa, 1926); of. In re Gubelman, 13 Fed. (2d) 732 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926); In re Zimmerman v. Forshay, 14 Fed. (2d) 527 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926).; Leach v. Citizens' State Bank, 211 N. W. 522 (Iowa, 1926).
1 Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U. S. 352 (1879); Cowell v. Springs Co.,
100 U. S. 55 (1879); Stone v. Penn Yam, K. P. & B. Ry., 197 N. Y. 279,
90 N. E. 843 (1910); Clark v. Memphis Street Ry., 123 Tenn. 232, 130
S. W. 751 (1910).
2 State ex rel. Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, 282 Mo. 261, 221 S. W. 728
(1920).
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express statutory prohibitions or a contrary state policy. There
seems to be no statute expressly forbidding foreign corporations
with a dual share structure from exercising their powers in Cali-
fornia', so the instant decision is in effect a declaration that it is
not contrary to California "policy" for a foreign corporation
with a dual share structure to exercise its powers in the state.
By statute in California, a non-licensed corporation cannot
sue in the state courts or acquire title to land within the state.3
Similar statutes have been strictly enforced in most jurisdic-
tions. The only necessary inquiry in respect to the instant case
is, therefore, whether in the absence of the license statute, a
foreign corporation having a dual share structure, can exercise
these powers in California. If it can, it is entitled to a license
upon compliance with the formal requirements, as the granting
of a license merely enables a corporation, domestic or foreign, to
exercise whatever corporate powers it would have in California,
if there were no license statute.
The cases which have decided whether or not state policy for-
bids a foreign corporation from exercising one or all of its
powers within the state indicate that the "comity rule" is not
controlling as a criterion by which such cases can be "correctly"
decided. The cases turn on policy instead of "comity," and there
is no agreement as to what is state policy. On the one hand, it
has been held that the exercise by a foreign corporation of a
particular power which cannot be exercised by a domestic corpo-
ration is contrary to local state policy. Thus a foreign corpora-
tion has been denied the power of making an assignment to
creditors in contemplation of insolvency.5 On the other hand, it
has been held that the absence of a power in domestic corpora-
tions does not of itself indicate that the exercise of such a power
by a foreign corporation within the state contravenes state
policy. Under this rule, a foreign corporation has been allowed
to exercise its power of making an assignment to creditors in
contemplation of insolvency.( And, while it is said that the
3 Calif. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1923) Act 1743, § 1.4 Imperial Curtain Co. v. Jacob, 163 Mich. 72, 127 N. W. 772 (1910);
Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites, 204 N. Y. 231, 97 N. E. 587 (1912);
Loomis v. People's Construction Co., 211 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914)
(Wisconsin statute); cf. De Forest Wireless Tel. Co. v. Superior Court
153 Calif. 533, 96 Pac. 15 (1908); Beickel, Enforceability of Contracts of
Unregistered Foreign Corporationzs (1916) 50 A~ms. L. REv. 041.
5 Fowler v. Bell, 90 Tex. 150, 37 S. W. 1058 (1896). Also the power to
hold stock in another corporation has been denied. Golden v. Cervenka,
278 Ill. 409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917) ; Dunbar v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 238 Ill. 456, 87 N. E. 521 (1909). And the power to do a real
estate brokerage business in Illinois. Warren v. Inter-State Realty Co.,
192 Ill. App. 438 (1915).
6Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N. Y. 563, 35 N. E. 932 (1894). Also the
power to do a multi-form insurance business. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
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exercise of a power which relates only to "internal management"
will not be declared against the state's policy, the courts reach
conflicting decisions as to whether or ilot a certain power is one
of "internal management." 7
In view of these decisions it would seem that the "comity rule"
merely states that the exercise of its powers by a foreign corpo-
ration within the state will be permitted under some circum-
stances. The question as to whether the powers may be exercised
is settled in each case when the court announces its view as to
the policy of the state. In deciding what this policy is, the courts.
apply the rule or interpretation which will give the desired re-
sult.8 It is submitted that the decision as to the state's policy
relative to the exercise of corporate powers by a foreign corpo-
ration is in each new case left to a court's unrestricted discretion
which, in turn, is influenced by the background and habit pat-
terns of the particular court.
Under these circumstances the decision of the instant case
seems sound, in view of the economic desirability of permitting
corporations a wide exercise of their corporate powers through-
out the states. It is also supported by authority.9
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO TAX INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
Traditionally, the transfer of personalty, both tangible and in-
tangible, was subject to an inheritance tax at the domicil of
the decedent.' This tax was based on the theory that the state,
Co. v. Linehan, 73 N. H. 41, 58 Atl. 956 (1904); People v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 153 Ill. 25, 38 N. E. 752 (1894). And the power to do a
loan business in Illinois. Stephens v. Pratt, 101 Ill. 206 (1882).
7 It has been stated that the exercise of a power by a foreign corpora-
tion will not be forbidden as against local state policy if it merely concerns
the internal management of the corporation. See San Remo Cooper Co. v.
Moneuse, 149 App. Div. 26, 28, 133 N. Y. Supp. 509, 511 (1st Dept. 1912).
On the theory that it was not a matter of internal management of the cor-
poration, the courts have held that a by-law of a foreign corporation, which
affects a contract with a citizen of the state and provides that the in-
sured shall not be presumed dead after seven years absence without being
heard from, is void as against state policy. Sweet v. Modern Woodmen,
169 Wis. 462, 172 N. W. 143 (1919) ; Haines v. Modern Woodmen, 189 Iowa,
651, 178 N. W. 1010 (1920). The Supreme Court, under similar circumstan-
ces, decided that this by-law could not be declared void by the state court
as against the public policy of the state, since this was a matter governed
exclusively by the laws of the domicil of the foreign corporation. Modern
Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389 (1925).
8 See cases cited supra notes 5 and 6.
9 In State ex rel. Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2,
a mandamus was granted to compel the secretary of state to issue
a license to do business in the state although the foreign corporation had
no par value shares and domestic corporations could not be formed with
such a share structure.
' There has been a conflict of opinion from the eighteenth century as to,
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having absolute control of the succession of property, could tax
the privilege of transferring the property in which it allowed
succession, i. e., realty within the state, and, since "nzobilia sequ-
untur personam," all personalty of residents.2 After the fiction
of mobilia. sequuntur personam was discarded for other pur-
poses,3 it survived in inheritance taxation because the laws of
the state of the domicil, generally followed in determining the
succession to personalty, were said to create the privilege.4 The
holding in the Frick case 3 upset the orthodox rules as to inheri-
tance taxation. It took the more realistic view that the laws of
the situs of tangible personalty control its succession because
that state has physical possession of the res, and therefore can
determine whether the laws of the domicil shall be followed6
Therefore, it held that only the state of the situs could consti-
tutionally tax the transfer of tangibles. It expressly avoided
any change in the existing rule as to intangibles.&7 Since the
-whether the tax should be levied at the domicil of the decedent or at the
situs of the property. SHULTZ, THE TAXATION OF INHERITANCE (192G) 108.
2 "The theory upon which the inheritance tax is imposed and sustained
is that the state which confers the privilege of succeeding to the property
may attach thereto the condition that a portion of the property shall be
contributed to the state." In re Dillingham's Estate, 196 Calif. 525, 532, 2'48
Pac. 367, 370 (1925). This is the generally accepted theory. But the absolute
control of the state has been questioned as the basis of the tax, especially
since the federal tax is justified on other grounds. Powell, Extra-TcM,-
toial Inheritance Ta.ation (1920) 20 COL. L. Rsv. 1; cf. Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900).
3. Originally personalty was considered to have no situs except at the
domicil of the owner. See Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Bl. 605, 690 (C. P.
1791). Later personalty was taxed separately from the person. Tappan
v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 19 Wall. 490 (U. S. 1874). The resulting
double taxation was not considered unconstitutional. Blackstone v.
Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903). In direct taxes on property,
taxation at the domicil was held unconstitutional. Louisville & Jefferson
Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 23 Sup. Ct. 463 (1903); Delaware,
L. & W. Ry. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 25 Sup. Ct. 669 (1905); Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 3G (1905).
4 Cf. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 22 Sup. Ct. 515 (1902); Cassidy
v. Ellerhorst, 110 Ohio St. 535, 144 N. E. 252 (1924); In re Dillingham's
Estate, supra note 2; (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 492.
5 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925).
6 The state of the domicil determines the succession of personalty only
through the courtesy of the state of the situs. Compare the statement of
Mr. Justice Holmes: "To a considerable, although more or less varying,
extent the succession determined by the law of the domicil, is recognized
in other jurisdictions. But it hardly needs illustration to show that the
recognition is limited by the policy of the local law." Blackstone v. Miller,
supra note 3, at 204, 23 Sup. Ct. at 278. See also (1920) 14 CLIF. L. REv.
225; (1920) 33 HARV. L. Rnv. 582. But cf. supra note 4.
7The rule as to intangibles is that they may be taxed either at their
situs or at the domicil. Blackstone v. Miller, supra note 3; Bullen v.
Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916). This has been re-affirmed
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burden of double taxation is felt more widely in the cases of
intangibles than in the case of the comparatively small amount
of tangibles held by non-residents, the problem will have to be
worked out by the Supreme Court whether the principle of the
Frick case is to cause the abandonment of the inconsistent rule
as to intangibles," or, if not, to what the principle is to be limited.
In a recent Connecticut case, In re Silberman,9 the rule of the
Frick case was limited to tangibles. The estate of the decedent,
a resident of Connecticut, consisted (aside from property hav-
ing a situs in the state) of an interest in a limited partnership
organized and doing business in New York, certificates of stock
in domestic and foreign corporations deposited in New York,
mortgage and United States Treasury bonds kept in New York,
a savings bank account, a life insurance policy and cash in New
York. The government bonds and cash were held to be tangible
and therefore taxable only in New York under the Frick case.
The rest of the estate was held to be intangible and therefore
subject to a tax on the privilege of succession accorded by the
state of the domicil. The decision recognized that it was in con-
flict with the theory of the Frick case.
The question of the proper basis for the inheritance tax is
not simply a legal one. Increased expenditures by the states
have forced the exploitation of all possible sources of revenue.
This has meant oppressive double taxation. Plans have been
suggested by economists 10 and attempts have been made by the
legislatures, through reciprocal exemptions," to avoid this double
taxation. None has been successful because of the conflicting
since the Frick case by the Supreme Couft in a dictum. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256 (1926). It
has, however, been criticised. Seefurth, Recent Limitations on the Power
to Impose Inheritance and Estate Taxes (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 870; (1926)
14 CALIF. L. REv. 225; (1925) 24 MICH. L. REv. 50.8 Analytically no distinction can be made between propcrty in tangibles
and in intangibles. (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 357; (1926) 14 CALIF.
L. REv. 225. It is legal relations that constitute "property" as to both
.tangibles and intangibles, and these "relations" are merely predictable
state action. Any state, whether it is the domicil, the situs, or some other
is a creator of "property" in so far as its action and its courts are available
to an owner. A limitation on the power to tax, therefore, cannot properly
be based upon the notion that one state creates the "property" or the
"privilege of succession." See (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 429.
9 105 Conn. 192, 134 Atl. 778 (1926).
10 Gf. Natl Tax Ass'n Model Inheritance Tax Law (1922); Model Sic-
cession Tax and Estate Tax Law (Tentative draft, 1925) reprinted in
SHULTZ, op. cit. Supra note 1, at 326 (recommending an inheritance tax on
intangibles only at the domicil of the decedent).
11 For a summary of the legislative attempts of the states to mitigate
double taxation, see SHULTz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 144, 250. Con-
necticut (Laws 1925, c. 239); Massachusetts (Laws 1925, c. 338); New
York (Laws 1925, c. 143); and Pennsylvania (Laws 1925, Act No. 391)
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needs of the borrowing and the lending states.'2  The former
whose industries are financed by foreign capital will have in-
sufficient revenue for the maintenance of their governmental
functions unless they tax at the situs, while the latter where the
holders of wealth reside need the revenue from the tax at the
domicil.
The solution of the difficulty does not lie in the mere rejection
of the domicil as the basis of the tax, because that leaves the
more difficult problem as to where the situs of an intangible
is. Even in the case of debts not evidenced by a transferable
document there are two legal theories which support the two
conflicting economic factions. On the one hand, the situs of
debts is said to be at the domicil of the creditors, since they are
not the property of the debtor and being intangible cannot have
a situs separate from their owners."3 On the other hand, it is
urged that they, like tangible property, have a situs where they
are controlled, which is the domicil of the debtor because it is
there that they are enforceable. 4
Where the obligation is evidenced by a transferable document,
there is the difficulty of determining whether the document is
merely evidence of an intangible claim or is itself so representa-
tive of the claim as to be subject to the rules applied to tangibles.
Thus cash and government bonds are generally accepted as tax-
able at their physical situs." Negotiable instruments and non-
governmental bonds are less often considered as tangibles, al-
though there seems little reason for the distinction. They are
taxed as tangibles where deposited,2G at the domicil of the owner,IT
have reciprocity clauses exempting personalty of residents of any other state
which does not tax the personalty of the residents of the state having the
reciprocity clause.
2 Seligman, Proceedings of National Confercnce on Inlh ritance and E.,tate
Taxation (1925) 61; SHDLTz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 252.
13 See State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 320 (U. S. 1872);
Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 Hwv. L. Rsv. 597, 603; Chamberz,
State Inheritance Tax on Foreign Held Bonds or Notcs Sccurcd by a Mort-
gage on Land in the State (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 172, 175. "Situs" is a
term that might well be restricted to physical relations; but if it is used with
respect to intangible legal relations, then all "property," whether dezcribed
as tangible or intangible, has a situs in every state creating and recognizing
the "property." See supra note 8.
14See Blackstone v. Miller, sutpra note 3; Carpenter, Jurisdiction over
Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishmcnt, and Taxation
(1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 905, 924. The fact is, of course, that the duty
of the debtor can be enforced in any state where process can be served
upon him, not merely in the state of his domicil.
15 See State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, supra note 13; New Orleans v.
Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110 (1S99).
1L6 New Orleans v. Stempel, su'pra note 15; Bristol v. Washington Co., 177
U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (1900); Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34
Sup. Ct. 607 (1914); ef. In re Gates, 243 N. Y. 193, 153 N. E. 45 (1926).
7Kirtland v. Hotchlkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); In re Lowell, 208 App.
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and, in the case of mortgage bonds especially, where they are
dnforceable. 1
In the case of shares in corporations, five jurisdictions have
attempted to tax.19 The domicil of the decedent taxes the trans-
fer of shares like other intangibles.20 The state of incorporation,
the domicil of the obligor, taxes on the ground that it controls
the transfer as well as the enforcement of the obligation.21 From
the point of view of the benefits given by the state of incorpora-
tion, the basis of the tax is very slight unless the physical prop-
erty of the corporation is also within the state. The state where
the physical property is situated, if it is not the state of incorpor-
ation, can no longer tax the transfer,22 although if the mechanism
of corporate ownership could be ignored this state would be
granting the privilege of transferring tangible property. Where
the transfer is not complete until the change is made in the
books, the privilege of transfer depends on and may be taxed
by the state where the transfer books are kept.2 3 Under the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the transfer of the share of stpck
is dependent on the transfer of the certificate and thus the pri-
vilege of succession would seem to depend, as in the case of a
tangible, solely on the state where the certificate is deposited.
2 4
If this interpretation was accepted it would simplify the pro-
blem of inheritance taxation of stocks and negotiable instru-
ments, but it would make difficult the collection of revenue in
Div. 201, 203 N. Y. Supp. 312 (1st Dept. 1924); People v. Forman, 322 Ill.
223, 153 N. E. 376 (1926).
28 Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 18 Sup. Ct. 392
(1897); Kinney v. Treas. and Receiver Gen., 207 Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586
(1911). Contra: State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, supra note 13; In re
Gates' Estate, supra note 16; Chambers, op. cit. supra note 13.
19 (1925) 38 HAuv. L. REv. 809.
20 Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra note 7; In re Dillingham's Estate, supra
note 2; of. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, supra note 7.
21 Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, supra note 3; see Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, supra note 7. When the shares represent
ownership in a corporation that is incorporated in several states, each state
usually taxes in the proportion that the amount of corporate property in
the state bears to the total value. It has been held that, since the in-
heritance tax was on a privilege within the absolute control of the state,
the tax on the shares need not be pro rata. Welch v. Burrill, 223 Mass.
87, 111 N. E. 774 (1916); In re Palmer's Estate, 183 N. Y. 238, 76 N. E.
16 (1905). Probably after the Frick case, the same requirement would
be made in the case of inheritance taxes as in other taxes that only a part
of the value of the shares should be taxed by each state of incorporation. Cf.
International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. 292
(1918), but compare Beale, op. cit. supra note 13, at 602.
22 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, supra note 7; Bardon v.
Hubbs, 246 Pac. 770 (Ariz. 1926); (1921) 35 HAnv. L. REv. 93; (1925) 2
N. C. L. Rnv. 107.
23 See (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 809, 815; ibid. 832.
% Newell v. Tremont Lumber Co., 109 So. 344 (La. 1926). Cf. Uniform
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the states where it is needed, because the taxable instruments
would be deposited so as to avoid the higher inheritance taxes.
In questioning a tax at the domicil of either the obligor or the
obligee or at the situs of the instrument evidencing the intangi-
ble, the courts should consider not only the double taxation of
the taxpayer but the duties of the individual to the state to
sustain his share in the expenditures affecting his person and
also those affecting his property. When these duties are owed
to different states by some individuals but not by all, some
method should be found to prevent inequality of burden. By ex-
tending the principle of the Frick case (either by applying it to
all intangibles or by enlarging the content of "tangible") or by
giving exclusive jurisdiction over intangibles to the domicil, the
courts would relieve one type of double taxation but would put
a double burden on some communities by relieving some of their
residents or property-holders of their share in the expenses of
the community. The problem of equality of taxation is a question
for careful legislation with consideration of all factors, rather
than for negative judicial legislation by the extension of the ap-
plication of the Fourteenth Amendment.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OF SOVIET RUSSIA
In view of the fact that Soviet Russia is being gradually recog-
nized by the other governments, and commerce and trade with
her is being resumed, it is of interest to note the present Russian
rules applicable to private international relations. The recent
work by Professor A. N. Makarov on the Russian Conflict of
Laws . makes it possible to set forth the existing state of the
Russian law.
The confederated states, of which the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics is composed, have practically the same sub-
stantive private law,2 but their rules of the conflict of laws are
Stock Transfer Act, TEmny, UNn oRm STATE LAWS ANNOTATED (1920) 345;
Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Co., 267 U. S. 22, 45 Sup. Ct. 207
(1925).
'DAs RUSSICHE ZMILPRIVATRECfT (Internationales Privatrecht, 1926).
2With the adoption of the Civil Code by the Russian Socialist Confeder-
ated Soviet Republic on Oct. 31, 1922, (in effect since Jan. 1, 1923) and
of a Code of Civil Procedure in 1923, a new order of things began in
Soviet Russia, for it constitutes a recognition of private rights on the
part of Russian subjects and their enforcement in the ordinary tribunals
of the land. The Civil Code was prepared under the direction of the All-
Russian Central Executive Committee and at its request was adopted, with
slight modifications, by the other Soviet Republics of which the Union
of Socialist Soviet Republic is composed (Ukraine, White Russia and the
Transcaucasian Confederation).
According to Article 9 of the Introductory law, the Civil Code was to
govern the entire territory of the Russian Socialist Confederated Soviet
Republic, but the autonomous republics embraced within the territory were
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not identical. No comprehensive statement of the rules of the
conflict of laws is to be found either in the federal legislation or
in the legislation of the particular states. Individual rules may
be found in the Consular Regulations of the Soviet Union, in the
circular letters issued by the central government, or in the laws
of individual states. The rules set forth in this article are
deemed to reflect the general viewpoint of the Soviet law, al-
though they are often supported only by express authority in
one or two of the confederated states.
3
The rules of the conflict of laws of Soviet Russia rest upon a
strict territorial basis so far as the acts in question take place
in Russia or concern property in Russia. Russian law applies,
therefore, to many transactions with respect to which, under the
point of view generally prevailing on the Continent, the per-
sonal law, that is, the law of domicil, or the law of nationality,
would be applied, for example, as regards marriage, succession,
etc. Exceptions to this principle can be established only by
treaty.
Russian subjects abroad are deemed to be controlled by Rus-
sian law in their personal relations, but by the local law in all
business transactions. It results from the principle of terri-
toriality that the capacity of foreigners in Russia will be gov-
erned by Russian law.4
A foreign association will be recognized as having juristic
personality if it possesses such according to its "personal stat-
ute." Foreign business corporations (juristic persons having an
economic object) are not permitted to transact business in Rus-
sia unless authorized so to do by the Russian government. As
regards all transactions entered into in Russia,'they are subject
to Russian law.5 A foreign business corporation not authorized
to transact business in Russia may sue within the Union of So-
cialist Soviet Republics, provided (1) reciprocity exists, (2)
the claim sued upon arose abroad, and (3) the defendant is a
to have the power, with the consent of the All-Russian Central Executive
Committee to supplement and modify the Code. This power, however, has
been made use of only very little.
The constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics conferred
upon the federal government authority to lay down the fundamental prin-
ciples of private law, which it has not exercised, and by implication upon
the Confederated Republics the power to legislate with respect to matters
not covered by the federal legislation.
8 Conditions are still such in Russia that an enlightened administration
of justice in accordance with the existing provisions of law is not as-
sured. See TIMiASCHEw, DIE GERICHTSVERFASSUNG (in Das Recht Sowjet-
russlands, 1925) 424 ff.
4 MAKAROV, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23-24; FREUND, DAS ZIVILBEGHT
SowJETRussLANDs (1924) 109. A person 18 years of age will be deemed,
therefore, of age in Russia in accordance with the Civil Code, § 7.
5 Introductory Law to the Civil Code, art. 1, note 8; MAXAROV, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 29-32; FREUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 109.
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resident of the Union.0 The rights of foreign juristic persons
pursuing some non-economic object will probably depend upon
reciprocity'-
Foreign commerce in Russia has become a state monopoly so
that the legal position of the state as a merchant is of great im-
portance. The questions raised thereby have been regulated in a
number of treaties entered into between the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics and foreign countries. In the treaty with Ger-
many it is expressly provided that the Russian government shall
be subject to the ordinary rules relating to procedure and exe-
cution as regards all transactions of private law entered into by
its representatives in Germany.
The maxim locus regit octum, which is generally followed on
the Continent as regards the form in which a legal transaction
must be clothed,' is recognized also in Soviet Russia. It does
not apply, however, to the creation or transfer of rights in im-
movable property situated in Russia, nor to the transfer of
obligations secured by such property. These must be executed
in the Soviet notarial form and when executed abroad, before a
Russian consul. The general rule seems to apply also to the
execution of wills. In accordance with the general maxim a
document, contract, will, etc., is valid, as regards form, if it
satisfies the law of the place where it was executed. The maxim
is understood on the Continent quite frequently as laying down
merely an optional rule, so that the transaction may be valid also,
as regards form, if it satisfies the law of some other state. In
Soviet Russia, such option appears to exist only betveen the law
of -the place of execution and the local law of Soviet Russia if
the parties are Russian. Accordingly, a will, executed abroad,
is valid if it satisfies the law prescribed by the law of the place
of execution, or, if executed by a Russian, it is clothed in the
Russian notarial form.10
Rights in property are governed by the law of the situs and
the courts of the situs have exclusive jurisdiction to determine
such rights.- Acquisition of title by adverse possession being
unknown to Soviet law, it follows that the ownership of a chattel
cannot change by reason of adverse possession while such chattel
is in Russia. 2
6 Introductory Law to the Civil Code, art. 8, note 2; MLucnoy, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 32-34; FREUND, op. cit. szpra note 4, at 109.
7 lakarov assumes that diplomatic reciprocity is not required and that
actual reciprocity by the courts is sufficient, Op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 33.
8 Ibid. 34-36.
9 See LORENZ EN, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1924) 316, note.
10 I AKA~ov, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39-41.
" Rights of private ownership in land have been abolished in Russia.
This precludes, of course, also the mortgaging of land. The Code deals
with ownership, building rights and pledges. Civil Code, §§ 52-105.
22 MAKAROV, op. cit. supra note 1, at 45.
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The general rule applicable to the form of legal transactions
is extended in Soviet Russia to the substantive provisions of
contracts, provided the contract is of a kind recognized by the
Russian Civil Code,13 for, if the matter is not dealt with in the
Civil Code, no effect will be given to the foreign contract.14 The
rule locus regit actum in its application to the substantive re-
quirements of contracts is not mandatory, it would seem, the
parties being free to contract with reference to the law of the
place of performance if such place of performance is in Russia.',
A marriage contracted in Russia must comply with the require-
ments of the local law.1  A marriage between Russian subjects
abroad, or a marriage between a Russian and some other na-
tional abroad, will be recognized in Russia if the Russian pro-
visions as to the essentials of marriage have been satisfied, but
not otherwise. In the matter of form it is sufficient if the local
provisions were followed.1"
The personal rights resulting from marriage are, according to
Soviet law, a common family name and mutual rights of sup-
port. 18 The common name, even of foreigners, is determined by
Soviet law if the marriage is celebrated in Russia,", and so is the
duty of mutual support as long as the spouses, native or foreign,
are within Russian territory.20 The Soviet law is deemed to
extend also to the personal rights resulting from a marriage
between Russian nationals abroad. If only one of the spouses
is a Russian, only rights common to their national legislations
can be asserted before the Russian courts.2'
According to Soviet law, marriage has no effect upon the
property rights of the spouses. This requirement of separation
of property cannot be changed by marriage contract.22 These
13 Ibid. 47-51.
14 A contract for personal services entered into abroad could not be en-
forced in Russia as this contract is regulated in the Code of Labor which
is regarded as belonging to public law. Ibid. 49.
Prior to the Civil Code all business transactions were controlled by the
state and regarded as matters of public law. As the Code deals with the
most important business transactions, the rule stated in the text has no
far-reaching practical importance.
IS Ibid. 48.
16 In the German-Russian Consular Convention of Oct. 25, 1925, it was
provided that a marriage between German nationals may be entered into
in Russia before a German consul. The marriage is valid if it conforms
to German law, both as to form and essentials. Ibid. 53.
17 Ibid. 52-57.
28 Civil Code, c. V.
39 MAKARoV, op. cit. supra note 1, at 60, 61.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. 61-62.
22 Marriage has no effect upon the property rights of the spouses. Civil
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rules are applicable to all marriages celebrated in Soviet Russia,
and to all marriages celebrated abroad between Russian nation-
als,2 3 or between a Russian and a foreigner.
A divorce may be obtained in Russia upon the mere agree-
ment of the spouses or even at the request of one spouse. -7, For-
eigners domiciled in Russia enjoy the same privilege. In view
of the extreme liberality with which divorce is granted, it is
apparent that any divorce of Russian spouses pronounced by
foreign tribunals will satisfy the Soviet requirements. Russians
living abroad may be divorced by a Russian consul if both
spouses consent to the divorce, or, if there is no agreement, by
a people's court at loscow.20
In Soviet Russia no distinction is made between legitimate and
illegitimate children .2 7 If a child is born of foreign parents in
Russia, it is of no consequence that it is regarded by the na-
tional law of the parents as either legitimate or illegitimate. The
personal rights of foreign parents and children living in Russia
are determined by Soviet law. This is true also of the property
rights between such parents and children, and their mutual
rights of support.2 S  Soviet law is equally applicable in these
matters in the case of Russians living abroad. -0
The legitimation of foreigners in Russia and of Russians
abroad is not possible in view of the fact that no distinction is
made in Soviet Russia between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren. Adoption has been recognized by the decree of March 1,
1926, and the provisions laid down therein are presumably ap-
plicable to foreigners in Russia and to Russians abroad.2"
Code, § 105. This rule is regarded as so basic in Russian law that a stipu-
lation to the contrary is null and void. MAKAROV, op. cit. supra note 1, at
,64.23 Property rights acquired abroad by subjects of Soviet Russia are gov-
erned by the foreign law, but the property rights of spouses resulting
from marriage are deemed so intimately connected with the family law
that they are dealt with from that point of view in the Russian conflict
of laws. MIAKAROv, op. cit. supra note 1, at 64.24 Where a Russian woman marries a foreigner, the principle of the
equality of the spouses which is fundamental in Soviet law makes it im-
possible to prefer the national law of either spouse. The result is that
marriage under those circumstances will have no effect upon the property
rights of the spouses. Ibid. 65.
25 Code of Family Law, § 87.
26 AMAKAR0V, op. cit. supra note 1, at 66-69. If the spouse seelding the
divorce is living abroad and the other spouse in Soviet Russia, the peti-
tion for divorce must be brought before the People's Court at the residence
of the spouse living in Russia. Ibid. 68.
27 Code of Family Law, § 133.
28 AMAKAROV, op. cit. supra note 1, at 70-72. The national law of the




In the matter of guardianship, the Soviet law applies the law
of nationality with respect to Russian subjects abroad, so far
as the Russian consuls are authorized to function as courts of
guardianship. With respect to foreign minors living in Russia,
the principle of strict territoriality which underlies the Soviet
regime would logically subject them to Soviet law. A govern-
mental circular letter of April 6, 1925, however, lays down this
principle only with respect to minors who are subjects of coun-
tries with respect to which there are no treaty relations, but
providing that the consuls of countries with which treaty rela-
tions have been re-established, though no treaty concerning
guardianship has been entered into, shall be authorized to act as
courts of guardianship in accordance with their national law.31
The succession upon death to property situated in Russia is
governed by Russian law.2 In view of the strict territoriality
of Soviet law, exceptions to the above rule can be based only on
treaty provisions. 3 . Property in foreign countries belonging to
Russians is subject to the law of the situs.34 As Russian law
recognizes the renvoi doctrine, it follows that so far as the law
of the country where the property is situated applies the na-
tional law of the decedent, the provisions of the Russian Civil
Code may become applicable.3 These rules govern also the
validity of wills, except as to form.30
Foreigners appear to have the same privileges as Russians as
regards access to the Russian courts. The jurisdiction of the
Russian courts is not affected by the nationality of the plaintiff,
nor by his having a Russian or a foreign domicil.'3
Foreign judgments are enforceable in Russia only if there is.
a treaty to this effectVs
E. G. L.
3"Ibid. 74-76.
32Ibid. 82. Rights of inheritance, whether based upon intestate or testa-
mentary succession, were abolished in 1918, totally in the cities and for-
mally in the country. Such rights were recognized again by a decree of
May 22, 1922, where the estate does not exceed 10,000 rubles in gold.
FREUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 279.
The Russian law of succession has in view only movable property, im-
movable property not being subject to private ownership.
.3 MAxAROV, op. cit. supra note 1, at 82. The Russian Foreign Office
appears to depart from the above principle, holding that the succession to
movable property belonging to a foreigner may be governed by his national
law, where judicial reciprocity between the states exists in this regard.
Ibid. 83.
3'Ibid. 87.
35 The Russian courts have applied renvoi where it enabled them to apply
the Russian local law. Ibid. 19, 87.
-36 Ibid. 89-90.
37 Ibid. 91-95.
38 Ibid. 97-99.
